Simulation methods are applied to investigate the redistributive effects and cost effectiveness of the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (FMWA) and an additional hypothetical increase in the federal minimum wage to $9.50. The simulations make use of a large data set created by matching and merging the March CPS hierarchical files with the Earner Study files containing the best available information on wages, hours and earnings. Each of FMWA's three 70¢ increments in the minimum wage and the hypothetical rise of $2.25 are compared to two alternative policies -equiproportionate increases in the EITC and equiproportionate rebates of FICA taxes paid by low-income families. The redistributive effects of increasing the minimum wage and alternative policies with equivalent aggregate costs are evaluated using dominance methods. The cost effectiveness of raising the federal minimum wage is assessed by comparing its relative costs to EITC and FICA alternatives that achieve the same policy objective, which is defined and measured by reductions in the aggregate Sen Index of poverty.
I. Introduction
For more than seven decades increasing the federal minimum wage has been the most widely used policy aimed at reducing poverty and improving the well-being of low-income families. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (P.L. 75-718) has been repeatedly amended to extend coverage and the nominal minimum wage has increased 22 times, rising from 25¢ per hour to $7.25. During most of these increases the conventional wisdom in economics maintained that government imposed wage floors actually made the poor worse-off and increases in the minimum wage only magnified the harm. Nobel Laureate George Stigler (1946) was an articulate proponent of the conventional view. Thirty years after his influential paper Stigler (1976) continued to believe that minimum wages reduced the well-being of the poor. Today, Neumark and Wascher (2008) adhere to the conventional wisdom asserting that there are no net reductions in poverty when the minimum wages rises. They argue (2008, p. 6-7) that the primary effect is to redistribute income among low income families and suggest that an increase in the minimum wage "may" cause poverty to rise.
The new minimum wage literature [Katz and Krueger (1992) , Card (1992a Card ( , 1992b , Card, Katz and Krueger (1994) , and Card and Krueger (1995) ] arrived at two central conclusions that contradict the conventional wisdom. The first, relatively modest increases in the minimum wage have zero disemployment effects, remains controversial and is linked, in the minds of many, with the second conclusion, which asserts that minimum wage increases have small beneficial distributional effects on poor and low-income families. More recent work by Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (1996) , Neumark and Wascher (1994 , Abowd et al. (2000) , and Formby, Bishop and Kim (2005) , hereafter (FBK), find that small disemployment effects almost certainly accompany even modest rises in the minimum wage. Furthermore, FBK (2005) provide evidence from simulation studies, which show that even the most extreme estimates of the disemployment effects do not completely offset the small income gains by families in the lower tail of the income distribution. Thus, the question of whether there are small gains, small Population Survey. The hierarchical March CPS files provide the best available data for studying the impacts of policies on poverty and the income distribution, while the Earner Study files contain the best information on worker's wages, hours and earnings. Second, the data are adjusted to reflect changes in state minimum wage laws across time and the FMWA mandated wage increases are applied to individual workers in the subset of states where the federal minimum wage is binding. The resulting increases in earnings are tracked to family incomes and aggregated. Thus, workers in states in which the federal minimum wage is nonbinding are unaffected, but poverty and income redistribution effects are evaluated using the entire national sample of approximately 56,000 families and 127,000 persons. Third, a number of alternative 1 1. There is also the question of how the costs are distributed, which depends upon the distribution of expenditures on goods and services that make use of minimum wage and near minimum wage workers. This paper considers aggregate costs, but does not investigate expenitures or the distribution of costs.
simulations are applied to the matched, merged and state minimum wage adjusted March CPS and Earner Study data.
We consider three general sets of disemployment effects and two distinct wage spillover or ripple effect regimes of rising minimum wages, which results in six different simulation scenarios. The three sets of disemployment effects ─ FBK's (2005) best estimates of adverse effects on specific groups of teenagers and young adults, zero disemployment effects of the sort asserted by the new minimum wage literature and FBK's (2005) extreme elasticities ─ turn out to be very similar. For this reason we focus on and report only the simulations based on the best estimates of disemployment effects. In contrast, the two sets of simulations incorporating different wage spillovers or ripple effects of increases in the minimum wage have dramatically different total policy costs, so we report results for both spillover regimes. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview and discusses the simulation methodology. Section III describes the matched, merged and state minimum wage adjusted data.
Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V summarizes major conclusions and briefly discusses the policy implications.
II. Overview and Methodology
To examine the redistributive effects and cost effectiveness of increasing the federal minimum wage we simulate the impacts of rising federal minimum wages and compare them to two alternative labor market policies that could have been adopted in lieu of the FMWA.
Similarly, these policy alternatives could be used instead of mandating a further increase in the federal minimum wage to $9.50 as proposed by President Obama. Specifically, as an alternative to the minimum wage we consider equiproportionate increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and equiproportionate reductions in payroll (FICA) taxes paid by workers in low-income families. Mandatory increases in the federal minimum wage are the starting point for the analysis. We use the high quality microdata set, described in the next section, to identify workers eligible for federal minimum wage increases. Appropriate wage increases are then awarded and the simulated gains in worker earnings are tracked to family incomes and poverty and other distributional impacts are then measured. It deserves emphasis that in analyzing poverty and the distribution of income we use the full sample for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. But the minimum wage is rising and wage spillovers are occurring in only the states in which the FMWA mandated increases are binding.
The redistributive effects of rising federal minimum wages and alternative labor market policies are analyzed using quintiles and the top five percent of comprehensive family incomes.
To provide more information on redistributive effects in the bottom third of the income distribution we also consider three distinct groups of low-income families, which are identified using poverty lines set at 100%, 150% and 200% of the official US poverty threshold. Families with comprehensive incomes below 200% of the official threshold are referred to as low-income.
The welfare implications of federal minimum wage increases and alternative labor market policies are evaluated using dominance comparisons of entire income distributions.
The cost effectiveness of the minimum wage vis-à-vis alternative labor market policies are evaluated using comprehensive (after taxes and after transfers) income and distribution sensitive Sen indexes of aggregate poverty. The Sen Index and most other measures of poverty require a set of thresholds that incorporate equivalence scales, which separate the poor from the nonpoor. We calculate Sen Indexes at three different poverty lines drawn at 100%, 150% and 200% of the official poverty threshold. Multiple poverty lines are analyzed for three reasons.
First, since the work of Ruggles (1990) it is widely acknowledged that no one knows for sure exactly where to draw the poverty line either in terms of cash income, as in the official poverty statistics, or in terms of comprehensive income, which provides a far better measure of family well-being. Second, the different poverty lines and associated poverty measures allow us to gauge the sensitivity of different segments of the bottom tail of the family income distribution to changes in the federal minimum wage and alternative labor market policies. Third, as noted above, the different poverty lines are also used to segment the low-income population into three groups to better understand the redistributive effects of alternative policies within roughly the bottom third of the income distribution.
To measure cost effectiveness we proceed as follows. For each FMWA mandated increase in the minimum wage and the hypothetical rise to $9.50, we calculate the costs of the policy and estimate its poverty reducing benefits. Given the reductions in poverty resulting from higher minimum wages we next simulate equiproportionate increases in the EITC and equiproportionate rebates of FICA taxes to workers in low-income families that achieve the same poverty reducing benefits as measured by the Sen Index. Finally, we estimate the associated cost of the change in the EITC and FICA policies required to bring about the same poverty reducing policy objective. By design the alternative policies have the same beneficial effects on poverty as the rise in the minimum wage. The ratios of the costs of alternative policies reveal the relative cost effectiveness of one policy vis-à-vis the other.
Reliably simulating the effects of the FMWA requires that three complicating factors be taken into account and incorporated into the methodology. These factors include: state minimum wage laws and nonbinding federal minimum wages, disemployment effects, and ripple or wage spillover effects of rising minimum wages. Each of these aspects of the simulation methodology is briefly explained in the remainder of this section. additional states and became nonbinding in one state. In Stage 3 the FMWA became binding in 10 more states. Furthermore, the marginally impacted states in Stages 2 and 3 received minimum wage increases (new federal minimum -state minimum) that were far below the 70¢ increment specified in the FMWA. In addition, a number of state laws were in place when the FMWA became effective (July 24, 2007) mandating future increases in state minimum wages during the phase-in period of the new federal minimum wage. Today, the federal minimum wage is nonbinding in 15 states containing approximately 30% of the U.S. population. Thus, the FMWA has a differential impact across time due to state minimum wage laws and changes in the binding and nonbinding effects of the federal minimum wage.
State Minimum
To incorporate the complications arising from state minimum wage laws into our simulations of the FMWA we proceed as follows. First, we use the state codes in the CPS to create subsamples of workers in the states in which the federal minimum wage is binding. We then identify the low-wage workers in the subset of states in which the federal minimum is binding and award each eligible worker a legally appropriate hourly wage increase. Second, we assume the state minimum wage laws prevailing in July 2007 remain unchanged as FMWA is phased in. Third, increases in state minimum wages in the period immediately prior to FMWA are used to adjust the data of low-wage workers in each state before simulating the initial effects of increasing the federal minimum wage. Finally, provisions in state laws mandating increases in minimum wages during the FMWA phase-in are simulated and assumed to take effect between Stages 1 and 2 and again between Stages 2 and 3.
Disemployment.
Simple supply and demand analysis strongly suggests minimum wage increases lead inevitably to disemployment of some minimum wage workers. The EITC and FICA labor market policy alternatives are also likely to have some effects on employment, but the case is most clear and compelling for rising minimum wages. There is now wide agreement that the disemployment effects are small and, as noted above, the new minimum wage literature asserts that they are zero for relatively small minimum wage increases. However, the preponderance of the evidence suggests nonzero, but small elasticities. We follow FBK (2005) All disemployment effects are modeled as a reduction in hours worked by individual workers or, in the case of the EITC and FICA alternatives, their spouses. Finally, the small positive elasticities for two groups in the best estimates suggest that rising minimum wages lead to a substitution of some low wage worker for those losing hours. This substitution is further discussed below.
Spillover or Ripple Effect Wage Increases.
It is reasonable to expect increases in the minimum wage to affect workers whose wage rates are below and somewhat above the legal minimum. Gramlich (1976) was the first to argue that minimum increases would spillover and impact other low-wage workers who were not earning the exact minimum. Other researchers have referred to the spillovers as ripple effects and we distinguish between trickle-down effects, which raise the hourly pay of subminimum wage workers, and trickle-up effects that increase 3 3. These estimates are based upon the work of Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (1998 wage rates of some low-paid workers earning more than the minimum. There is a compelling rationale for expecting a ripple effect as is made clear by the following simple model of lowwage labor markets. Suppose there are two classes of workers, minimum wage and near minimum wage workers. Further, employers can and will substitute among workers from the different classes depending upon relative wage rates and worker productivity. Competitive labor markets determine wage rates that reflect compensating differentials in labor productivity.
Mandated increases in the minimum wage rate disturb the equilibriums prevailing in low-wage labor markets, which leads unequivocally to substitutions of near minimum wage workers for the now relatively more costly, but less productive, minimum wage workers. As a consequence, the demand for near minimum wage workers rises and their wages increase, which results in wage spillovers. In contrast, the demand for minimum wage workers decreases and disemployment occurs among minimum wage workers. Thus, wage ripple effects impacting near minimum wage workers and disemployment of minimum wage workers are linked as substitution effects and a new set of compensating wage differentials are incorporated into low-wage labor market equilibrium.
The theoretical scenario outlined above is both logical and consistent with FBK's (2005) best estimates of the employment and disemployment effects of rising minimum wages and the accompanying substitutions among workers that take place in low-wage labor markets as minimum wages rise. Furthermore, papers by DeNardo et al (1996) and Lee (1999) strongly suggest that minimum wage increases have important spillovers, but they do not investigate their magnitude. In addition, a comprehensive survey by Converse et al. (1981) following the 9.4% and 6.8% federal minimum wage increases of 1979 and 1980 revealed that 40 percent of all business establishments employing minimum wage workers reported paying higher wages to their workers earning above the minimum wage immediately following the change in the law.
Thus, there is both a theoretical rationale and empirical evidence suggesting that spillover effects accompany rising minimum wages.
In an early minimum wage simulation Browning (1981, 1983) In the second step, we use the intercept estimated from the overall log linear equation and fit separate regressions that pass through the new minimum wage of particular states, again using the entire dataset, not a state sub-sample. We note that at some point (in our case the 14.23 th percentile) the actual wage is greater than the regressed wage and we call this point z. To estimate changes in an individual's wage we differentiate between workers with wages above and below point z. If the observed wage is less than or equal to z, the trickle-up wage increase is:
Δ wage = simulated wage -regressed wage.
However, when the observed wage is greater than z the trickle-up increase is:
Δ wage = simulated wage -actual 2007 wage.
Therefore our final value for the individual wage rate is: Final wage = actual wage + Δ wage.
Using this procedure the trickle-up spillovers diminish monotonically and are zero at wages above $8.55 per hour.
In step 3 we repeat the trickle-up estimation procedures described above using the $6.55 
III. The Matched and Merged March CPS and Earner Study Data
To our knowledge we are the first researchers to merge the Annual Demographic File Unicon procedure by requiring matches between race, gender, age and other variables in the two data sets. The Appendix provides additional details on the matching procedure.
IV. Results
We first report estimates of the effects of increases in the federal minimum wage on the lower tail of the wage distribution using five wage-rate classes, defined as follows: below $5.15 per hour, $5.15 to $5.85, $5.86 to $6.55, and $6.56 to $7.25 (the three phases of the minimum wage increase), and $7.26 to $9.50 (the upper end of the low-wage distribution). Using these wage classes Table 1 shows the distribution of low-wages and annual hours worked immediately before FMWA and after each of the three mandatory 70¢ federal increments. (2,246/19,076) . While not shown in Table 1 .a, all low-wage workers (those in states where the federal minimum is binding and those in which it is nonbinding) receive an average increase in annual earnings of $306 or 2.5 percent.
It is now generally well understood that there is no strong connection between hourly wage rates of low-paid workers and the well-being of low-income families. 5 The principle reason for this is that many low-income families do not contain a low-wage worker. Table 2 provides evidence from the matched and merged March CPS and Earner Study files on numbers 4 4. In reviewing this table the reader should keep in mind that several dynamics are taking place simultaneously. Not only is the minimum wage increase and associated wage spillovers pushing some workers into higher wage classes, the successive 70¢ increments are causing more states (and workers) to be marginally impacted. In addition, state required increases in the minimum wage are reflected in the initial values (starting points) for Stages 2 and 3. 5. Stigler (1946) was the first to emphasize this point. It has also been stressed by Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (1996) and FBK (2005) .
and proportions of low-income families and all families with at least one low-wage worker. percent of all families and 6.2 percent of low-income families are affected by the first stage of the FMWA. These numbers expand in stages 2 and 3, but after the FMWA is fully implemented more than 85% of low-income families remain unaffected by the three successive 70¢ minimum wage increases and the accompanying wage spillovers. Table 2 .b shows that the numbers are even smaller when in the trickle-up ripple effect is excluded from the simulations. After the FMWA is fully phased in more than 96% of low-income families are unaffected in Table 2 .b.
The hypothetical $2.25 increase in the federal minimum wage to $9.50, which is assumed to be binding in all states, leaves 91% of low-income families unaffected. These findings have implications that warrant emphasis: for most, but not all, poor and low-income families there is little relationship between low incomes and low-wage work. Table 3 shows the redistributive effects of increases in the federal minimum wage and makes comparisons to two alternative equal cost labor market policies that provide equiproportionate increases in EITC benefits and equiproportionate rebates of FICA taxes. Table 3 .a provides results for simulations including both trickle-up and trickle-down ripple effects and Table 3 .b shows the impacts of trickle-down wage spillovers only. These tables show clearly that minimum wage increases perform relatively poorly compared to the EITC and FICA alternatives in delivering redistributive benefits to low-income families. However, the small benefits are positive not negative, which goes against the conventional wisdom and supports one of the major conclusions of the new minimum wage literature.
The policy alternatives we consider are simulated as equal cost, but by design the EITC and FICA tax rebates are targeted on low-income families. In contrast, the minimum wage policy is targeted on low-wage workers. For example the FICA rebates go only to workers in low-income families, so all benefits flow to the bottom two quintiles of families and are zero above the second quintile. Likewise, the EITC is targeted for the most part to families in the bottom two quintiles, with only small amounts spilling over into the higher quintiles. Since many low-wage workers belong to families that are not low-income, much of the benefits of the minimum wage accrue to upper quintile families. For example, in Table 3 .a the $23 average benefit in Stage 1 of the FMWA received by the third quintile from the minimum wage increase is greater than the average cost of the policy ($20). Clearly, our simulations verify the now widely accepted conclusion that the minimum wage is not "well-targeted."
The redistributions in Table 3 can be used to address Neumark and Wascher's (NW's) claims that minimum wage increases result in no net gains at the bottom of the income distribution and that the primary effect is to redistribute income among low-income families.
Contrary to the no net gain assertion, Table 3 shows small increases in comprehensive family income for each subgroup within the low-income population. This is the case in each stage of the FMWA, the hypothetical increase from $7.25 to $9.50 and all simulation scenarios that we consider. The easiest way to investigate the argument that the primary effect is to redistribute income among low-income families is to use the income distribution before the minimum wage increase and the income gains shown in Table 3 to construct the Lorenz curve (LC) and concentration curves (CC) of minimum wage benefits. Since all of the simulations we consider are applied to the same initial income distribution the redistributive effects in Table 3 show the marginal impacts of alternative equal cost labor market policies on the distribution of family incomes. It is now generally agreed that dominance principles provide the most general method of assessing the welfare implications of income distributions and redistributions.
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First order dominance (FOD), also referred to as rank dominance, assumes only anonymity and that larger incomes are preferred to smaller.
Distributions and redistributions that cannot be ranked using FOD may be ranked using second order dominance (SOD), which requires an additional and stronger assumption, referred to as the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. SOD is equivalent to so called Generalized Lorenz (GL)
dominance. Furthermore, SOD and GL dominance are equivalent to ordinary Lorenz dominance (LD) when the means of the distributions and redistributions being compared are the same.
When the means are unequal LD shows comparisons of inequality. Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1992) and Bishop and Formby (1994) . For proofs of the original theorems see Saposnik (1981 Saposnik ( , 1983 and Shorrocks (1983 To analyze the cost effectiveness of raising the federal minimum wage we first estimate the poverty reducing effects and aggregate costs of FMWA and a hypothetical $9.50 minimum, which is assumed to be binding in all states. Table 5 presents these results and compares them to alternative EITC and FICA labor market policies that achieve the same reductions in aggregate poverty as measured by Sen's (1976) distribution sensitive index. The Sen index is defined as
where H is the headcount poverty ratio, I is the ratio of the average income compared to the poverty line (hereafter referred to as the income gap ratio), G p is the Gini coefficient of income inequality among the poor, and q is the number of people below the poverty threshold. There are several striking features of Table 5 . First, the poverty reducing effects of FMWA, while not zero, are extremely small irrespective of exactly where the poverty line is drawn. In each stage of the FMWA, both simulation scenarios and all three poverty lines, the reduction in the Sen index never exceeds 0.6 of one percent. Across all stages of the FMWA combined the largest simulated reduction in the Sen Index is 1.5 percent (Table 5 .a at the 150 percent poverty line), but is less than one percent at the official poverty line in both Table 5 .a and 5.b. Second, the trickle-up wage spillovers add marginally to the small poverty reducing effects of the FMWA, but more than double the aggregate costs. Third, the hypothetical $9.50 minimum wage (Table 5 .b) is quite costly. Increasing the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.50 is more than seven times more costly than all stages of the FMWA combined. Finally, compared to the final stage of FMWA, the hypothetical $9.50 federal minimum wage reduces the Sen Index of poverty by 3.3 to 3.9 percent depending upon the poverty line, but at a cost of $43.5
billion. This latter result suggests that extending the federal minimum wage beyond $7.25 may be subject to decreasing returns and rising costs in fighting poverty. The larger the federal minimum wage, the lower is the return in aggregate poverty reduction per dollar spent to bring about the mandatory higher minimum wages. Table 5 show the aggregate costs of the EITC and FICA policy alternatives that achieve the same reductions in the Sen Index of poverty as the increases in the federal minimum wage. Inspection of columns 3, 4 and 5 reveals that equiproportionate increases in the EITC is clearly the low cost poverty reducing alternative. Table 6 normalizes the aggregate costs and shows relative cost effectiveness ratios. For each poverty line the low cost EITC policy is set equal to 1.0. The minimum wage and FICA cost effectiveness ratios show how much more costly it is to achieve the same poverty reduction compared to the lowcost policy alternative. The results show that the EITC policy is more cost effective in reducing poverty than raising the minimum wage at every poverty line considered and in both simulation scenarios. While raising the minimum wage is consistently the least cost effective policy, its degree of cost effectiveness varies depending on the stage of the FMWA and the poverty line.
Columns 4 and 5 of
Inspection of the cost effectiveness ratios reveals that the FMWA is relatively more effective, i.e., less ineffective, in Stage 1 when the poverty line is set at 150% of the official level (ratios 1.73 with trickle-up spillovers and 1.42 without). In contrast, its relative ineffectiveness is greatest for the hypothetical $9.50 minimum wage also at 150% poverty line (ratio = 2.9).
Examining all stages of the FMWA combined; we conclude that reducing poverty by raising the minimum wage "costs" roughly twice as much as reducing poverty using the ETIC.
Furthermore, for all stages of the FMWA combined he FICA tax rebate policy dominates the FMWA in terms of cost effectiveness. Column 4 shows that the poverty reductions achieved by the hypothetical one-shot $2.25 increase in the minimum wage to $9.50 are 2.5 to 2.9 times more costly than the EITC alternative. Finally, we note the FICA tax rebate policy is consistently less cost effective than the EITC, but more cost effective than increasing the minimum wage.
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Simulation studies are applied to a unique dataset to evaluate the redistributive effects, aggregate costs, and cost effectiveness of increases in the federal minimum wage. The principal focus is on the three successive 70¢ per hour increases mandated by the Fair Minimum Wage Act (FMWA) of 2007, but a hypothetical one-shot $2.25 increase in the federal minimum wage to $9.50 is also analyzed. The results of two different simulations with distinct minimum wage ripple effects or wage spillovers are reported. The first simulation scenario estimates and incorporates wage spillovers accruing to both subminimum wage workers (a trickle-down wage ripple) and to low-wage workers earning slightly more than the federal minimum (a trickle-up wage ripple). The second simulation includes only downward wage spillovers on workers earning subminimum wages.
9
All simulations include two alternative labor market policies that could have been adopted in lieu of raising the federal minimum wage ─ an increase in EITC 9 9. We do not consider upward wage spillovers in analyzing the hypothetical $9.50 minimum wage. As explained above, a $9.50 minimum wage added on top of the FMWA increases takes us well beyond the bottom quintile of the wage distribution observed in the matched, merged and state minimum wage adjusted 2006 data that we use in this study. We have less confidence in estimating upward wage spillovers of rising minimum wages as we go beyond the lower-tail of the wage distribution, which we define as the bottom quintile of wage rates. cost to accomplish the same poverty reduction using the EITC and FICA policy alternatives.
These simulations are used to measure the relative cost effectiveness of raising the federal minimum wage vis-à-vis the EITC and FICA alternatives.
A number of major conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the matched, merged and state minimum wage adjusted March CPS and Earner Study data confirms that for most, but not all, poor and low-income families there is little relationship between poverty and low-wage work. In all but one of the simulations more than half of the total benefits of rising minimum wages accrue to families above the low-income cutoff (twice the official poverty line). small, totaling more than $12 billion for the FMWA in the more costly simulation scenario and almost $6 billion in the low-cost simulation (no trickle-up spillovers). The hypothetical $9.50 wage simulation is an extension of the low-cost FMWA scenario (no trickle-up spillovers) and its cost is estimated to be $43.5 billion. As a consequence, an increase in the federal minimum to $9.50, as proposed by President Obama, would be more than seven times more costly than all Stages of the FMWA combined. Of course, the poverty reductions accompanying the $9.50 minimum wage would also be larger than those achieved by the FMWA. However, the cost of the minimum wage policy rises much faster than the aggregate poverty rate falls. This result suggests that increasing the federal minimum wage to $9.50 is subject to decreasing returns and rising costs in fighting poverty. Thus, the greater the federal minimum wage, the lower is the return in poverty reduction per dollar spent to bring about the mandatory higher minimum wages.
Measures of the relative cost effectiveness of alternative labor market policies reveal that federal minimum wage increases are much more costly than either the EITC or FICA policies in achieving the same poverty reducing objectives. Compared to the EITC, the minimum wage cost effectiveness ratios for all stages of the FMWA combined vary from 2 to 2.4 depending upon the poverty line considered and the wage spillover simulation scenario. For the hypothetical $9.50 minimum wage the cost effectiveness ratios range from 2.6 to 2.9. Thus, the total cost of achieving the same reduction in aggregate poverty is two to three times greater using a minimum wage policy instead of the more cost effective EITC policy. For minimum wage increases above $7.25 the cost effectiveness ratio is closer to three.
The policy implications of our simulations are clear. The FMWA is neither cost effective nor the best labor market policy for reducing poverty and improving the overall well-being of American families. Equiproportionate increases in the EITC is a more cost effective policy and is superior to the minimum wage in all pairwise comparisons when evaluated using second order (Generalized Lorenz) dominance as well as ordinary Lorenz dominance. Thus, if Congress and the President are prepared to raise the federal minimum wage to $9.50 per hour, then working families and the nation as a whole will be better-off if the nominal minimum wage is held constant and the EITC is increased to accomplish the same policy objective. 1. Low-income family Subgroups are categorized by the size of family comprehensive income relative to the official U.S. Government definition of poverty. Thus the <100% group includes all families with comprehensive equal to or below the poverty line. The 100-150% group includes all families with comprehensive equal to or above the official poverty line, but below 150 % of the value of the poverty line. The group150% -200% includes families with comprehensive less than twice the official poverty line and above 150 % of the value of the poverty line. 1. Low-income family Subgroups are categorized by the size of family comprehensive income relative to the official U.S. Government definition of poverty. Thus the <100% group includes all families with comprehensive equal to or below the poverty line. The 100-150% group includes all families with comprehensive equal to or above the official poverty line, but below 150 % of the value of the poverty line. The group150% -200% includes families with comprehensive less than twice the official poverty line and above 150 % of the value of the poverty line. Alternative poverty lines are defined as a percent of the official poverty cutoff and measured using comprehensive family income. 3. These cost s are computed by multiplying the average costs per family by 125 million American families. Note that the costs of the FMWA do not vary across poverty lines. However, given the costs of the mandated increase in the federal minimum wage in each stage, poverty reductions vary with the different poverty lines, 4. The FICA cost is well below FMWA and EITC. This is because we restrict the FICA transfer to workers in families below 200 percent of the official poverty line and the maximum possible rebate to this group is less than the cost of the $9.50 minimum wage increase. Therefore, in analyzing the hypothetical $9.50 minimum wage we do not consider a FICA rebate alternative policy. 6. WAGE RATE. The procedure for determining the hourly wage is as follows:
• If an hourly wage is reported, we use the amount given by the variable ERNHR.
• When the ERNHR of a worker is missing or zero, we calculate the value by dividing the variable WKLYWG (average weekly earnings) by Hours (hours worked last week).
• Any worker with a wage rate less than $2.13 is treated as if they are self-employed and are not included among the wage and salary workers analyzed in this report. Any income generated by such workers is treated as if it were self-employment income.
MATCHING PROCESS -MARCH CPS AND EARNER STUDY (ORG) DATA.
• In the CPS, a household is in the survey for 4 consecutive months, rotates out for eight months, returns to the survey for four more months and then permanently rotates out. sample by using appropriate interview month identified by the MIS variable.
• To match households, families and individuals in the March File with persons in the ORG File, the following variables are used: combinations of households and select the best matching case by using the processes explained in the next step.
• When one set of household residents move away and another set takes its place in the same house, the household is identified by using household number (variable name HHNUM) and deleted from our sample.
• To match the individuals within a household, we use the variables of household type (variable name HHTYP), number of person in household (variable name NUMPER), line number within household (variable name LINENO), race, sex and age. When all variables listed above are the same in both the Match and ORG data, each individual is then treated as "matched".
• We next calculate the matching percentage within a family. A 100% match of individuals within a family in both data sets is a perfect match. A zero matching percentage is a perfect nonmatch. All families with a zero matching percentages are deleted from the sample.
• For families for which there is neither a perfect match (100%) nor a perfect nonmatch (0 %), a partial matching of individuals exists. For partially matched families we then focus on the earners within the family. If we are able to match all earners, the family is considered as matched and we include it in the sample. To accomplish this final step in the matching process we proceed as follows:
 We count the number of earners. If the number of earners or household type (variable name HHTYPE) are not same, the family is deleted from the sample.
 For the remaining partially matched families, we compare the sex, race, and ages of earners and count the number of matches of these variables for each earner. When the difference of ages is less than two, we consider that two ages are same. Also, we sum the individual matches within a family and calculate the family matching percentage for all three variables.
 Finally, we select the matching families. When there is at least one earner who has same value for all three matching variables and the family matching percentage is above fifty %, we treat it as matching and include in the sample.
• In summary, to be included in the sample a family must satisfy one of the following matching conditions:
 Have the same MIS, HHID, STATE, and have a 100 % matching of individuals within a family,  Have the same MIS, HHID, STATE, HHTYPE, the same number of earners, at one earner matched perfectly on three personal variables (RACE, SEX, and AGE), and the family matching percentage above 50 percent.
 Have MIS = 4 or MIS = 8 in the March data, because these cohorts have the key information on both family and household incomes and earner study data.
